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Most scholars of property law, at least in common law jurisdictions, subscribe
to the view that there exists a rule of law that has the following content:when a
person takes possession of land,or of a chattel, that person acquires a proprietary
interest in relation to that land or that chattel. This interest is good against all
those who do not have a stronger title, and those without a title stronger than
that of the possessor will commit a legal wrong against her if they interfere with
the land or chattel. Behind these propositions lie a number of puzzles. When
will a person ‘take possession’ such that this proprietary interest arises? And why
should we distribute unowned resources according to a rule of first possession,
and not some other rule? In this book, Michael J.R. Crawford adds to the
literature that examines these questions, and offers a theory of the rule that
draws upon an impressively broad array of sources, ranging from the doctrinal
to the game theoretical.
Before offering that theory,Crawford presents, in two introductory chapters,
an admirably concise and clear restatement of the view that the basics of prop-
erty law can best be understood by starting with the proposition that an owner
of property is that person who has a right to exclude others from physically in-
terfering with that property.Building out from that claim,Crawford argues that
the role of possession in the law can be easily stated: the act of taking possession
is one method – like others such as manufacture – by which one can acquire
a right to exclude others from a particular item of property. Thus, possession is
factual, and does not describe a right of any sort. It follows, on this account, that
it is unhelpful to say that the property torts are concerned with interferences
with possession. Suppose that I go on holiday and leave my bicycle unattended
outside the front of my house. I can bring a claim in conversion against its thief.
This is because I have a right to exclude others from the bicycle, and not be-
cause I ‘possess’ it despite being unable to touch, move, or physically prevent
others from taking it (51).
With this framework in place, Crawford moves on to set out his theory
of possession, which comes in two parts. The first examines the concept of
‘taking possession’ and asks what it means. He argues that many definitions of
the concept – that focus on a person’s control of a thing and on their intention
in exercising that control – are wrong. Instead, a person will take possession of
land or of a chattel wherever they perform an act that is, as a matter of social
fact, an accepted way of signalling that person’s intention to claim the land or
chattel. Second,Crawford asks why possession has taken on its role as a method
of creating property rights.His answer is that the law gives effect to a non-legal
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convention, that has, for reasons of human psychology, emerged as a salient
way of resolving a coordination problem caused by the scarcity of resources.
Possession (and its absence) is a very visible asymmetry that exists between two
people in competition for a resource, and so the non-possessor spontaneously
defers to the possessor’s claim. Over time, a convention is created and, with it,
norms which guide behaviour. It is in our interests to respect the convention,
lest others take it upon themselves to challenge our own holdings.
Assessing theories of private law is a notoriously difficult task. Crawford’s
main aim is to promote understanding of the law as it is.He claims that the first
limb of the theory ‘accurately describes the way in which possession works in
the law’ in ways that other theories do not (64), and that the law’s rules ‘cannot
be understood’ in isolation from the second (113). Are either of these claims
convincing? The first is hard to make out because Crawford does not offer a
detailed account of alternative ‘theories’ of what it means to take possession.
Clearly, the main competitor is one that defines possession as an appropriate
degree of physical or factual control, paired with an intention to exercise that
control on one’s behalf. What it might mean to have such ‘control’ is not ex-
plicitly spelled out. Crawford primarily thinks of control as a factual ability to
physically prevent other people from interfering with the land or chattel, but
this is clearly not what the law requires.Nor is it impossible to think that ‘con-
trol’might mean something very different: if I am steering a cruise ship,we can
say that I control that ship, but I cannot hold it or physically prevent people
from interfering with it, because of its size.
This lacuna leads Crawford into difficulty because he offers a theory of the
law that appears to aim at replacing the law. It is the control-plus-intention test
that courts actually apply to disputes, and it has the backing of a unanimous
House of Lords (Pye v Graham [2002] UKHL 30). If our aim is to understand
the law as it is, then we surely need very convincing reasons to suppose that
the test does not accurately capture the law’s substantive content. Without a
detailed analysis of what the test might mean, and how those possible meanings
map onto the case law, it is hard to see how a theory of the law can be justified
in rejecting it.
On the second claim, it is not made entirely clear why we should accept that
we cannot understand the law without Crawford’s theory.Why do we need to
know the cause of a legal rule if we are to understand its operation? It cannot be
because we need that knowledge to iron out wrinkles in the law or to resolve
novel cases.No matter how correct Crawford’s theory of possession is, it cannot,
without more, generate claims about how the law ought to deal with a given
set of facts.
Seemingly aware of this point, Crawford offers, in addition to his theory, a
normative defence of the law that is later used to resolve a number of well-
known controversies. That defence is, again, composed of two elements. The
first is the claim that the law is ‘minimally fair’ because ‘no one is systematically
excluded from benefitting from it’ (132). Anyone can stake a claim to property
by taking possession, and so no one is excluded from the rule on the basis of
arbitrary personal characteristics such as their race or gender.The difficulty with
this argument is that it seems to be wrong, in that it overlooks that some people,
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who are not able-bodied, may be excluded by a rule that requires them to
perform physical acts.Crawford recognises this problem but is content to allow
‘redistributive mechanisms’ to correct this particular form of unfairness (134).
Second,Crawford argues that the status of possession as a non-legal convention
gives the law some good reasons to rely on it. In particular, he endorses the
argument,most prominently made in a series of works by Thomas Merrill and
Henry Smith, that law that is self-applying is likely to lead to minimal disputes
and low administrative cost.
A reader new to property theory may wonder whether this is really the best
that can be said in defence of the law.Crawford does not engage with the sub-
stantial literature that seeks to provide such a defence, but instead endorses the
view that any such account is doomed to fail because it cannot get over the
hurdle posed by the ‘unilateral’ element of acquisition: ‘as a general philosophi-
cal matter, it seems impossible to explain why any nominally duty-imposing act
should bind others in the absence of their consent’ (123). This brief statement
of the hurdle does not provide a full reflection of that philosophy. It has, for
example, been argued – most prominently by Kant and his modern followers
– that the problem could be dissolved through some legislative act of the state,
or, alternatively, that the troubling features of a unilaterally imposed duty might
be outweighed if the interests that the duty serves are sufficiently important.
Although one might argue that neither of these responses is adequate to meet
the unilateralism objection, it is a shame that Crawford does not consider them.
Given that Crawford’s arguments provide only a relatively weak normative
defence of the law, the prescriptive claims that he makes in the final few chapters
are somewhat undermined. He considers three problematic areas: disputes be-
tween a finder of a lost chattel that is found on land occupied by someone who
is not the owner of that chattel; the application of the law where the possessor
in question is a thief; and the treatment of the good faith purchaser at common
law.His argument in relation to the third can be the most easily stated: there is
a conflict between the original owner and the purchaser because that purchaser
has formed an expectation – on the basis of convention – that the seller of the
property has an entitlement to it. There is therefore no good reason to favour
one over the other, and we should be content with a certain rule that always
favours original owners, or that always favours the bona fide purchaser (196).
The discussion of the other two problems is more interesting. Crawford ar-
gues that the rules governing lost chattels found on or under land should not
be understood as being examples of the occupier of that land having possession
of those chattels. Instead, ‘occupation of land’ lines up alongside manufacture
and taking possession as one method by which one might acquire new rights
in chattels (159). The reason for this is that a land occupier has no intention in
relation to chattels lost by others on her land, and, Crawford argues, one can-
not signal one’s intention to claim a chattel if no such intention exists (66). Of
course, it follows that the orthodox understanding of possession, as control plus
intention, also straightforwardly suggests that these rules are not possessory.
Finally,Crawford endorses the view that a thief ought to acquire a proprietary
interest in stolen property.He claims that, because people lack the information
required to discern between innocent possessors and thieves, people will defer
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to a thief’s possession regardless of the law’s position (178). It is, however, hard
to see how this can take the form of an argument about what the relevant legal
rule ought to be. Crawford might be taken to be arguing that, if the law did
not recognise title in the thief, it would not benefit from those values that a
convention-based legal rule might be said to promote. If our focus is on min-
imising cost, plausibly the law’s rules should be easy to follow, and one might
think that citizens are more easily guided by norms of law that tell them not to
interfere with possessed property, rather than norms that tell them not to inter-
fere with innocently-possessed property. I doubt, however, that this argument
works in this context. Those who deal with stolen property will owe duties in
relation to that property to its true owner, and people will generally assume
property that is possessed to have an owner. It follows that the norms imposed
by the law in relation to a stolen chattel – even if the thief acquires no right
that others not interfere with it – are perfectly clear and will be self-applied by
citizens: do not interfere with it, because it is not yours.
Crawford’s monograph is a welcome addition to the literature that examines
personal property doctrine from a theoretical perspective. There is much to be
gained from a close reading of his arguments, which cut across disciplines and
should give as much food for thought to doctrinal lawyers as to legal theorists.
If personal property scholarship is to make real progress,more work of this sort
– that weaves doctrine and theory together – is sorely needed.
Alexander Waghorn∗
Ernest Lim, Sustainability and Corporate Mechanisms in Asia, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2020, xix + 409 pp, hb £95.00
When I first picked up Ernest Lim’s Sustainability and Corporate Mechanisms in
Asia, it was not without reservations that it would be dry, uninspired, and in-
accessible. However, as I quickly discovered by the first chapter, my reserva-
tions were unfounded. As it turned out, the book was clear, eye-opening, and
absorbing.
The key issue which Sustainability and Corporate Mechanisms in Asia deals
with is whether certain corporate mechanisms affect sustainable development
in four common law jurisdictions in Asia: Singapore; Malaysia; Hong Kong;
and India. Lim, quoting from the Brundtland Report (issued by the United
Nations’ World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)),
helpfully frames ‘sustainable development’as ‘development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs’. The corporate mechanisms in question, of which there are
six, are: (1) sustainability reporting; (2) board gender diversity; (3) constituency
directors; (4) stewardship codes; (5) directors’ duty to act in the best interests of
the company; (6) and liability of companies, shareholders and directors.
∗Pembroke College, Cambridge.
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While I understand that there is extensive literature on the relationship of
company law, on the one hand, and sustainability, on the other, Lim’s book is
original, perceptive and distinct from existing literature in at least three respects.
First, most existing literature tend to focus on the United States, United King-
dom or European jurisdictions.There is less of such literature focussing on Asia,
and I imagine even less which approach the subject by taking a comparative re-
view of jurisdictions in Asia.
Second, it is important to highlight that an unusual feature of the four com-
mon law jurisdictions of Singapore,Malaysia, Hong Kong and India, especially
when compared to other common law jurisdictions such as the United States
and United Kingdom, is that the controlling shareholder in a substantial num-
ber of the largest companies in Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong and India is
the government through its state owned enterprises (SOEs). An issue which
has therefore received limited attention in existing literature in this area is the
role of the SOEs in encouraging or frustrating sustainability through the afore-
mentioned six corporate mechanisms.The existing scholarship on sustainability
places considerable emphasis on the role of institutional shareholders, particu-
larly socially responsible investors or impact investors, in promoting sustain-
ability.This is perhaps understandable because institutional shareholders are the
world’s largest group of shareholders. However, government owners constitute
the second largest percentage of shareholders in the world, and SOEs, of which
the government is the controlling shareholder, are a pervasive and critical fea-
ture in many jurisdictions around the world especially in Asia (‘Owners of
the World’s Listed Companies’ OECD Capital Market Series, 2019). Yet there
appears to be little critical examination of this topic (even in recent, leading
scholarship such as Sjåfjell-Bruner (eds) The Cambridge Handbook of Corporate
Law, Corporate Governance and Sustainability, CUP, 2020. Lim’s book has filled
this lacuna. He challenges the reader to reconsider whether certain aspects of
corporate mechanisms that originated in the Anglo-American jurisdictions are
appropriate or effective for promoting sustainability when transplanted to the
Asian jurisdictions with concentrated ownership companies, such as SOEs.
Third,Lim’s book marks a significant shift in the debate from one based on an
actor-centred approach (which compares the effects of the values and attitudes
of key stakeholders such as senior management and consumers on sustainability)
and a behaviour-centred approach (which compares companies’ sustainability
behaviour across different countries) to one that is based on the effects of corpo-
rate mechanisms on sustainability, and how the pursuit of sustainability ought
to shape the reforms in corporate governance. Non-legal literature seems to
be principally concerned with both the actor-centred and behaviour-centred
approaches (see Williams and Aguilera, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in a
Comparative Perspective’ in Crane et al (eds),The Oxford Handbook of Corporate
Social Responsibility,OUP, 2008).The shift in focus in Lim’s book complements
the existing non-legal research by opening up new avenues of inquiry. For ex-
ample,because the law not only reflects public interest and social values,but also
directly or indirectly constitutes them, it is worthwhile inquiring how corpo-
rate law and governance has constituted the values and attitudes of stakehold-
ers toward sustainability. Moreover, another topic worth exploring is whether
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stakeholders’ behaviour regarding sustainability is different in companies with
controlling shareholders, particularly the government in SOEs, as compared to
companies with non-controlling shareholders.
Lim devotes one chapter in turn to each of the six corporate mechanisms. In
Chapter 2 on ‘Sustainability Reporting’, Lim analyses the structure and con-
tents of sustainability reporting rules, in particular, the merits of a comply or
explain approach taken by these rules, as well as the dearth of external oversight
on these rules, and the lack of sanctions for breaching them. In Chapter 3 on
‘Board Gender Diversity’, Lim considers whether having female directors im-
proves corporate governance and the financial performance of a company, and
critiques existing measures taken by companies in the four Asian jurisdictions
to increase the number of female directors. In Chapter 4 on ‘Constituency
Directors’, Lim examines the pros and cons of having constituency directors
(which are directors who are appointed by non-shareholders – a feature which
does not exist in Singapore,Malaysia and Hong Kong), to promote sustainabil-
ity. In Chapter 5 on ‘Stewardship Codes’, Lim investigates whether stewardship
codes (ie standards of conduct for institutional shareholders) have been effec-
tive in promoting sustainability in the four common law jurisdictions and pro-
poses reforms to these codes. In Chapter 6 on ‘Directors’ Duty to Act in the
Best Interests of the Company’, the issue of whether a director’s duty to act in
the best interests of the company can also be used to promote the interests of
non-shareholders, employees, the community and the environment is exam-
ined. In Chapter 7 on the ‘Liability of Companies, Shareholders and Directors’,
Lim evaluates how courts and legislation, in order to circumvent the limited
liability principle of companies, have lifted the corporate veil and imposed li-
ability on directors, shareholders or the entire corporate group for the wrongs
committed by a company (or on a parent company for the wrongs committed
by its subsidiary).
It is difficult to find fault with the soundness of Lim’s methodology or the
extensiveness of his research;evidently,a staggering amount of research has gone
into the book. Lim has pored over data from the reports of the top fifty listed
companies by market capitalization in each of Singapore,Malaysia,Hong Kong
and India (ie an eye-watering two hundred reports in total), and used hundreds
of sources of academic literature. In terms of legal academic literature,Lim refers
to literature from Singapore,Malaysia,Hong Kong, India, and from other com-
mon law jurisdictions such as the United States and United Kingdom, as well
as from civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany and France.As is probably nec-
essary for a topic as broad and current as sustainability, Lim additionally consid-
ers social, economic and cultural perspectives, quoting, for example, from John
Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. And, fittingly for a book focussed on Asia, Lim
occasionally dips into Mahabharata, the Koran and the teachings of Confucius.
Lim argues clearly and cogently throughout his book, but what I appreciate
most about his arguments is that they are also fair and balanced.He thoughtfully
considers different points of view, and where the data does not support a neat
and convenient conclusion, he readily admits that it does not. For example,
and somewhat surprisingly (at least to me), in Chapter 3 on ‘Board Gender
Diversity’, he concludes that the available data and studies do not unequivocally
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demonstrate that having female directors improves corporate governance or the
financial performance of a company.
Of all the chapters, I found two especially thought-provoking. The first is
the aforementioned Chapter 3 on ‘Board Gender Diversity’. Although Lim
concedes that having more female directors may not improve corporate gover-
nance or the financial performance of a company, he argues that having female
directors cannot be justified only in terms of such utilitarian benefits. There
is, disquietingly, a significantly unbalanced proportion of female to male di-
rectors in the top fifty listed companies (by market capitalization) in Malaysia,
Hong Kong, India and Singapore. As of 2018, female directors make up 27.9
per cent, 18.2 per cent, 16.7 per cent and 15.8 per cent of the boards of such
companies in Malaysia, Hong Kong, India and Singapore respectively, and Lim
makes the case that companies should examine what are the social, economic
and cultural issues that women face that led to this inequality in the first place,
and what companies can do to address these issues. Here, Lim helpfully offers
simple, practical and concrete steps a company can take to promote the wel-
fare of women and ensure a more level playing field between men and women
in the search for directors – providing childcare support; enhancing maternity
leave; implementing flexible working arrangements; correcting pay discrepan-
cies between men and women; having mechanisms to address discrimination
in the workplace; requiring head-hunters to produce female candidates when
recruiting for directors; and grooming internal female employees for board po-
sitions. Lim humorously suggests, as others have, that ‘the Lehman crisis would
not have happened if it had been Lehman sisters instead of Lehman brothers’,
and one cannot help but wonder if he is right.
The second chapter I found particularly thought-provoking is Chapter 7
on ‘Liability of Companies, Shareholders and Directors’. The issue which Lim
examines in this chapter is whether the victims of harms committed by a sub-
sidiary company can seek compensation from the parent company (or a share-
holder of the parent company) if the subsidiary company is unable to compen-
sate the victim because the subsidiary company is insolvent or has no financial
means to do so.Although an answer in the affirmative would be contrary to the
central tenet of company law of limited liability, Lim correctly points out that
it is this tenet which encourages a parent company to undercapitalise its sub-
sidiary companies or structure its subsidiaries in such a way so as to minimise
its liability, for example, by having its valuable assets owned by one subsidiary
while having its hazardous business undertaken by a different (and undercap-
italised) subsidiary. Although structuring companies as described above is not
illegal,Lim forces us to question whether corporate law should, in the first place,
permit a company to manipulate its group structure in a way which allows it to
engage in hazardous activity without a need to bear responsibility for the harm
it causes.Here, Lim makes the case that the fact the controlling shareholder in a
substantial number of the largest companies in Singapore,Malaysia,Hong Kong
and India is the government has an important bearing on this question. Given
that the government has the responsibility to safeguard the social and economic
wellbeing of its population, and given that the government has the resources
and expertise to actually do so, Lim argues that is fair, just and efficient that
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victims of harms committed by a company should be allowed to seek redress
from the government where the government is the controlling shareholder. I
agree.
If I had one criticism of Lim’s book, it is that it appears to be written with
academics as its target audience in mind. One instance of this is in Chapter
7 on ‘Liability of Companies, Shareholders and Directors’ where Lim goes to
considerable lengths to explain the difference between creating an exception to
the principle of limited liability (ie creating an exception to the principle that
shareholders are not liable for the debts of a company and are only liable for any
unpaid amount of their shares) and piercing the corporate veil (ie disregarding
the separate legal personality of the company),and stresses the importance of not
conflating the two. Although the difference is appreciated, it is not apparent if
the difference is material since both would result in liability on the shareholder.
And Lim observes that courts themselves do not always make the distinction
when imposing liability on shareholders for the wrongdoings of a company.
In my view, it would be unfortunate if Lim’s book is only limited to aca-
demics as its audience. Sustainability and Corporate Mechanisms in Asia is an im-
portant, erudite and accomplished work. It should be read by the very direc-
tors, C-suite executives, policy makers and leaders responsible for corporate
social responsibility in the very companies which are the focus of his book.
I recommend it without hesitation to anybody who has an interest or stake
in corporations and sustainability in Asia. Because, as Lim has eloquently and
persuasively argued throughout his book, there is not only a clear and positive
correlation between sustainability and a company’s financial performance, but
because corporate sustainability ‘is a morally good thing to do’.
Edmund Lee∗
C.Op den Kamp and D.Hunter (eds),A History of Intellectual Property in 50
Objects, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, 429 pp, hb £17.99
A History of Intellectual Property in 50 Objects is a collection of essays about the
history of the branches of law that we today term intellectual property, each
chapter taking a single object as its starting point. Spanning a diverse range of
objects, from the twelfth century to today – from the Mona Lisa to the Kodak
Camera, the Lego Brick to the Internet – A History of Intellectual Property in 50
Objects is based on the idea behind the BBCRadio 4 seriesAHistory of the World
in 100 Objects presented by Neil MacGregor of the British Museum (published
by Penguin, 2012) which has also been adapted to popular subjects such as A
History of Cricket in 100 Objects (Serpent’s Tail, 2013). Approaching intellectual
property through objects, however, is more complex. Intellectual property is
thought to protect intangible subject matter rather than tangible objects. As
editors Claudy Op Den Kamp and Dan Hunter note in their introduction,
∗Head of Legal and Corporate Services, Asia Pacific, PZ Cussons.
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approaching intellectual property through objects raises the question of how
and whether the law reflects the theoretical assumption we have today, that
intellectual property involves a ‘separation between ‘“the thing” and the “idea
of the thing”’ (2).
The essays comprising A History of Intellectual Property in 50 Objects are au-
thored primarily by legal academics, but also by scholars from other disciplines
(for example art, history, film studies, and computer science). All the contribu-
tions are scholarly and rigorous – based on original research – but also accessi-
ble to the non-specialist reader.As the sheer diversity of subject matter makes a
comprehensive summary impossible, this review instead draws together five ex-
amples of perspectives that permeate the volume and demonstrate the scholarly
value of studying intellectual property from the standpoint of objects.
First, a number of the essays demonstrate that objects can take us to intricate
stories about legal development. Lionel Bently’s essay concerning the Singer
sewing machine in the nineteenth century, shows how the study of a single
object can take us to cases which ‘unknowingly’ provided ‘the foundations for
much of modern trade mark law’, for example the doctrine of genericide, the
concept of the public domain, as well as ideas about the ‘selling power’ of a
mark (77-79). Stefania Fusco, in discussing the Murano glass vase, shows how
glassmakers were granted ad hoc patents by the Venetian state from the late
fifteenth to eighteenth centuries (18).When, from the sixteenth century, glass-
makers began to leave Venice to relocate elsewhere in Europe, ‘they took with
them their understanding of the benefits of an exclusive right to practice their
inventions’ and these understandings contributed to the establishment of patent
laws in other countries for example Belgium,France and England (22-23).Dev
Gangjee uses the history of Champagne as a means of looking backwards, but
also speculating forwards, about sui generis protection for geographical indi-
cations. He shows that Champagne has exercised a formative influence on the
law in the twentieth century,but the ‘story of Champagne is still being written’:
with climate change possibly shifting the focus of wine-making away from con-
tinental Europe,Champagne’s ‘powerful influence’ on geographical indications
may in the future instead come from England (167).
Other chapters, ask whether the history of a single object can reveal some-
thing timeless about intellectual property. Drawing on original archival mate-
rial, Jane Ginsburg shows a successful application for a papal privilege from the
1590s, for Antonio Tempesta’s Map of Rome, to span ‘the full range of modern
intellectual property rhetoric, from fear of unscrupulous competitors, to author-
centric rationales’ (42).While some debates from the past may feel familiar, their
resolution is bound up with contingency, a point well illustrated by Peter Jaszi’s
chapter about Harriet Beecher Stowe’s nineteenth century novel Uncle Tom’s
Cabin. Jaszi traces ‘the winding path that copyright trod in the 19th and 20th
centuries’ concerning translation rights, international protection and term (81).
History reminds us that the extensive protection which copyright works enjoy
today, ‘beyond the wildest imagination of Stowe and her contemporaries’, is far
from timeless or inevitable (87).
Secondly, a number of contributions to A History of Intellectual Property in
50 Objects, illuminate important stories about cultural developments. Michael
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Punt argues that eighteenth century copyright statutes protecting engravings
in Britain underpinned the development of Hogarthian art. Copyright gave
the artist William Hogarth ‘the financial security to use art and aesthetics as
an instrument of political resistance’ (55). Chris Beauchamp shows that the
intervention of Alexander Graham Bell’s patent lawyers, defining the invention
broadly in the patent, coupled with the subsequent upholding of that patent by
the US courts, contributed to popular understandings of Bell as the inventor of
telephone technology: ‘the saga of Bell’s patent framed the way that the origins
of the telephone have been understood ever since’, that is, ‘a single invention,
arrived at by a single person in a decisive break from the prior art’ (103).
Thirdly, a number of essays provide a sophisticated understanding of the re-
lationship between law and technology.Maurizio Borghi charts the diversity of
early twentieth century legal responses, in different jurisdictions, to the emer-
gence of the player piano, technology that marked ‘the beginning of a war over
the control of music and content that is being fought to this day’ (153). Peter
Decherney discusses the Kinetoscope developed by Thomas Edison in the late
nineteenth century: a peep-show device for individual spectators to peer into
and watch moving images. Today, devices for viewing films by single specta-
tors are ‘staples of our existence’, yet in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, audiences preferred collective viewing of projected films (135).
Connecting innovative but unpopular technologies of the past, to those that are
ubiquitous today,Decherney shows the history of technology to be punctuated
by stops and starts, the picking up of ‘lost threads’ and the taking of ‘new direc-
tions’, rather than a single linear narrative of technological development (135).
Fourthly, foregrounding objects and their protection by intellectual prop-
erty laws over a long time-frame, enables interesting observations about rights-
holder behaviour over a long trajectory. Jeannie Suk Gersen, in a chapter about
the Chanel 2.55 handbag, shows that Coco Chanel, in the 1950s, openly en-
couraged the copying of her works. By contrast, by the 1980s, with the rights
in the hands of Chanel Inc, the approach was far less forgiving of imitation,
with millions spent annually on anti-counterfeiting (252). As a consequence,
the bag has a ‘duality’ as ‘both the paradigmatic original and the archetypal
copy – an embodiment not only of authentic and rarified luxury, but also of
fakeness, repetition, reproduction and substitution’ (253).
Fifthly, essays in this collection demonstrate that a focus on objects can ex-
pose the law’s blindness towards certain perspectives. Marie Hadley considers
the boxer Mike Tyson’s tattoo, recreated without consent on the face of one
of the actors in the film The Hangover Part II. Hadley notes a conflict between
copyright and ‘competing cultural rights to indigenous design forms’, as Tyson’s
tattoo was itself inspired by ta moko, the tattooing practice of the Maori peo-
ple of Aotearoa/New Zealand. Claims to the tattoo’s appropriation reveal ‘the
difficulty of claiming one truth in an intellectual property world that was born
in the Western philosophical tradition’ (401). In another chapter,Kara Swanson
shows how the story of patent protection for the corset, as an ‘oh so feminine
technology,challenged the association of technology,patents and invention with
masculinity’ in the nineteenth century (89). Not only was corset technology
accessible to female inventors, but patent litigation, concerning the corset’s
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utility, provided an opportunity to challenge ‘the gendered assumptions of the
lawyers, judges, and the law itself ’ (91).
The above five themes provide a non-exhaustive set of examples of the rich
and varied scholarship in the essays comprising A History of Intellectual Property
in 50 Objects and are indicative of the volume’s undisputed scholarly contri-
bution. As a whole, the volume is clearly organised, with the essays categorised
into five chronological time periods.The book design is attributed to co-editor
Claudy Op den Kamp, a scholar of film studies, and she brings a strong visual
dimension. The collection contains copious colour illustrations and these are
interspersed between the text in a creative way: text and image are intertwined
in the narrative of each chapter. For instance, in Decherney’s chapter (discussed
above), a picture of a person enjoying the long-forgotten technology of past-
times through head-phones – the Kinetoscope – is placed side by side with the
familiar image today of a person listening to their i-phone. The reader, in one
glance, immediately grasps the similarity of the two technologies. Similarly, in
a chapter about the protection of the PH-Lamp in the twentieth century, full
colour photographs of Poul Henningsen’s designs communicates ‘the marriage
between the aesthetic and the functional’, central to Stina Teilmann-Lock’s ar-
gument about the difficulty of fitting the lamp into intellectual property cat-
egories. The images, therefore, are equal partners with the text in the stories
told by each author. Indeed, in some cases, such as Swanson’s chapter about the
corset, punctuated by images which demonstrate the corset’s contested cultural
status, the images invite the reader to contemplate dimensions that go beyond
those discussed in the text: ‘the corset as a technology of race as well as of
gender’ (92-93 and caption on 91).
Despite these strengths – the high quality of individual chapters beautifully
crafted into a single volume – there are shortcomings. The history of intellec-
tual property, particularly copyright history, is a burgeoning academic field and
the content of the volume should, at least implicitly, reflect developments in
scholarship.While the collection does include contributions from a number of
undisputed leaders in the field, there are also notable absences from scholars
whose original work has been formative of our understanding of intellectual
property history in recent years, together with an absence of even some tacit
reference to their work. The result is that the volume, taken as a whole, occa-
sionally does not fully represent the current state of learning in the field. For
example, Robin Wright’s chapter about the Audiotape Cassette looks forward
to copyright debates of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, including the
legal treatment of private copying, but that story might also have been brought
into conversation with nineteenth and early twentieth century private copying
debates (charted in Alexander,Copyright Law and the Public Interest in the Nine-
teenth Century, Hart, 2010, 245, 282). In the Pre-Modern section, the shortest
section of the book (comprising just four essays and which might have encom-
passed pre-statutory history in jurisdictions beyond Korea and Italian states)
the problem is exacerbated by the odd editorial classification of Andrea Wal-
lace’s excellent chapter. The strength of Wallace’s scholarship lies with original
teaching about reproductions of the Mona Lisa in more recent times and not
with its broad-brush claims about copyright history, suggesting the absence of
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protection for art by privileges prior to the copyright statute in France passed
in the late eighteenth century (25). The voice of Katie Scott, the author of the
landmark work on the protection of art in France, whose extensive archival
work has uncovered the multiplicity of ways in which art was protected in the
Ancien Regime (Becoming Property: Art, Theory and Law in Early Modern France,
Yale University Press, 2018) is wanting here. Editing a volume of this nature, of
course, always involves difficult choices, but different decisions could have been
made: one contributor to A History of Intellectual Property in 50 Objects is the au-
thor of two chapters (Peter Decherney) and one editor is the co-author of the
editorial introduction and two chapters dealing with broadly similar subjects
(Introduction, Lego Brick and Barbie Doll all co-authored by Dan Hunter).
Despite these criticisms,this volume is a pleasure to read and contains original
scholarship of the highest quality. It is recommended both to scholars of law
and the humanities, as well as being of general interest to legal practitioners and
the general reader.
Elena Cooper∗
Hugh Collins,Gillian Lester and Virginia Mantouvalou (eds),Philosophical Foun-
dations of Labour Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2018, 368 pp, hb
£75.00
Published seven years after the seminal book The Idea of Labour Law which
fueled debates over the ‘idea’ and the ‘normative foundations’ of labour law
(Langille and Davidov (eds), The Idea of Labour Law, OUP, 2011)), this book,
written by leading philosophers and labour law scholars in the Anglo-Saxon
world, makes a seminal contribution to the growing literature on the theory
of labour law. For the editors, this book is original because it ‘offers the op-
portunity to shape for the first time a wide-ranging and pluralist philosophical
enquiry into the foundations of labour law,which in turn is likely to influence
the development of the subject and the law in the future’ (1).Couched in rather
Platonic and natural law terminology, the book conceives its task as searching
‘for the normative foundations of something that already exists, albeit perhaps in a
flawed form’ (16, emphasis added). In the editors’ view, though, this philosophical
endeavour is not of purely theoretical value. The discovery of the philosoph-
ical foundations of labour law is seen as a vital and to some extent existential
exercise for the subject and paradigm of labour law.
The editors’ introduction is followed by seventeen chapters organised in four
parts: Freedom, Dignity, and Human rights; Distributive Justice and Exploita-
tion;Workplace Democracy and Self-Determination;and Social Inclusion.This
division is invested with a universalist normative significance as each part is
claimed to represent a ‘key set of values that need to underpin any labour law
system’ (20, emphasis added).
∗Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, CREATe, School of Law,University of Glasgow.
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Part I opens with two chapters targeting the traditional contractual fram-
ing of the employment relationship as a fundamental threat to human freedom.
John Gardner considers the process of ‘contractualisation’ of the employment
relation, understood as a reduction of the richness of the employment relation-
ship to a bare contractual relation, as a pathology undermining human freedom
and leading to worker alienation.Picking the same target,Hugh Collins ‘argues
that there is an inherent tension between the legal structure of employment and
guarantees for the exercise of civil liberties and the principle of equality before
the law’ (48). He translates this contradiction into the positive labour law aim
of ‘reduction or elimination of the inherent conflict between the contract of
employment and liberal values’ (ibid). In the next chapter, Pablo Gilabert con-
tributes an insightful elucidation of the concept of dignity at work as resting
on ‘solidaristic empowerment’, a concept viewed as referring to the gener-
ation of ‘feasible and reasonable social schemes to support each other as we
pursue the development and exercise of our valuable capacities to produce in
personally and socially beneficial ways’ (86). Occupying a similar developmen-
tal paradigm of freedom as linked to human potential, Brian Langille argues
that an understanding of human freedom as intrinsic and instrumental good
inspired by the capability framework (by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum)
offers a better way of addressing the ‘existential crisis of labour law’ than the
traditional inequality of bargaining power paradigm.Not straying far from this
developmental approach to human freedom,David Cabrelli and Rebecca Zahn
examine how the civil republican account of freedom as non-domination can
be effectively deployed within a political and democratic framework for the jus-
tification of labour law. The last chapter of this part by Joe Atkinson combines
a scepticism over the desirability of human rights as a single universal founda-
tion for labour law with a thesis that a moral account of human rights is able
to play an important justificatory role for the discipline as part of overlapping
justifications.
The second part hosts multiple contributions dealing with the concepts of
distributive justice and exploitation as part of the foundations for labour law.
Guy Davidov develops a brilliant theoretical account on the implications of
different liberal distributive justice theories for the legitimacy of different types
of regulatory interventions. The chapter by Noah Zatz attempts to bridge the
theories of discrimination and labour law by an integrated account that com-
bines the structural focus of employment law theory with the inter-personal
focus of anti-discrimination law theory. The remaining three chapters in this
part question the concept of exploitation as a potential normative foundation
for labour law.The philosopher Jonathan Wolff defines exploitation as ‘a com-
pound relationship in which an individual’s vulnerable circumstances are used
by another individual in order to achieve a benefit for the exploiter in vio-
lation of fairness or flourishing norms’ (187) but is sceptical about whether a
single account of the concept is appropriate, arguing that it operates at two
distinct levels, namely that of the ‘moral acceptability of the nature of the con-
tractual arrangement and the moral acceptability of the process that led to the
structural situation that created the exploited vulnerability’ (ibid). In her highly
original account,Virginia Mantouvalou draws on the philosophical concept of
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exploitation (loosely inspired by a humanist interpretation of Marx) and applies
it as the basis for broadening the scope of the application of the legal concept of
exploitation beyond slavery, servitude, forced/compulsory labour law and crim-
inalisation.Mantouvalou invokes a structural conception of exploitation as the
normative basis for extending accountability beyond the employer towards the
state when it ‘knows or ought to have known of the vulnerability and the ex-
ploitation,or the immediate risk of exploitation’ (190).Finally,Horacio Spector
advances a risk theory of exploitation as the foundation for the legal right to
fair compensation. For Spector, the source of exploitation derives from the fact
that ‘the structure of industrial capitalism allows capitalists to systematically ex-
ploit wage workers in gratuitously taking from them a surplus that they would
be unwilling to relinquish if they were capable of spreading their occupational
risk’ (205, emphasis in the original).
The third part on self-determination and workplace democracy contains
only two, albeit excellent, chapters. Building on earlier work on contestation
and freedom of association Alan Bogg and Cynthia Estlund suggest a new plu-
ralist foundation for the right to strike as resting upon three basic liberties: forced
labour; freedom of association; and freedom of expression. The last chapter by
Martin O’Neill and Stuart White reminds us of the vital political functions
of trade unions in insulating the political sphere against the influence of the
wealthy.
The four chapters in Part IV discuss social inclusion as a potential norma-
tive foundation. Adopting a critical-historical method, the chapter by Joanne
Conaghan on ‘Gender and the Labour Law’ seeks to denaturalise the founda-
tional labour law distinction between the ‘paid’ and ‘unpaid’ labour as contin-
gent and historically determined and calls for the revisiting of the paid work
paradigm. Subsequently, Einat Albin draws on Nancy Fraser’s social justice ac-
count involving the dimensions of recognition, fair distribution and meaningful
representation to strengthen the normative foundation of social inclusion.In her
chapter on volunteer work,Sabine Tsuruda dismisses the current distinction be-
tween employees and volunteers on the basis of the character of activity (civic,
humanitarian or charitable) and proposes instead the concept of ‘merit inclu-
sivity’defined as ‘inclusivity with respect to skill and ability’ (306) as better posi-
tioned to bring volunteer work within the orbit of labour law.Finally, the chap-
ter by Mark Freedland examines the two ‘pillars of the foundations of labour
law’s edifice of social inclusion’, namely that of structuring/determining work
relations and labour migration. Freedland concludes that both have ‘recognis-
able philosophical foundations’ but they both have ‘deep conflictual cracks in
these foundations which we should be concerned to expose and then try to
repair’ (323).
The book is to be commended for the high-quality and lucidity of its chap-
ters and for charting some novel paths for future labour law scholarship, includ-
ing an engagement with exploitation as a normative concept. In the current
challenging times for labour law the prospect of finding a universal foundational
ground is unsurprisingly an appealing proposition. Inevitably for an important
work of such ambition and quality there will be some sources of controversy.
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Due to space considerations I must confine myself to briefly touching on two
of them.
Firstly, one might wonder whether there was scope to better deliver the
book’s promise to ‘offer the opportunity to shape for the first time a wide-
ranging and pluralist philosophical enquiry into the foundations of labour law’
(1, emphasis added). This is for at least two reasons. The Idea of Labour Law
and subsequent scholarship made a broadly similar liberal analysis of the ‘nor-
mative foundations’ of labour law. Hence the editors could elaborate more on
the distinctiveness of the concept of ‘philosophical foundations’ as opposed to
the established term ‘normative foundations’ along with explaining the analyt-
ical mileage gained by this substitution.Without this explanation, the assertion
that this is the first book to shape this debate appears vulnerable to the criti-
cism that it understates its continuity with previous literature. Similar concerns
may be voiced in relation to the pluralist nature of the philosophical inquiry.
If pluralism is meant to refer to the inter-disciplinary nature of the book as
combining accounts of philosophers and labour law scholars then this is an apt
characterisation. But if pluralism is used as a referent to the philosophical ex-
ploration of labour law through a representative range of diverse philosophical
traditions then this is not as straightforward. Without ignoring some diversity
in the accounts of individual chapters, all contributions with few exceptions
operate within an analytical liberal political philosophy paradigm. Except for
Conaghan’s chapter and some references in other contributions, the rich con-
tinental philosophy associated with critical theory, post-modernist and post-
structuralist accounts in their diverse formulations and shapes (including Queer,
anti-racist and post-colonial theories) along with a non-humanist account of
Marxism do not find a systematic exposition in individual chapters.Since an ad-
mirable feature of this book is that it presents the views of both philosophers and
labour law scholars, there is a sense of a missed opportunity to broaden the hori-
zons of labour law scholarship by engaging with the opinions of philosophers
of these traditions.This is of course not to deny the presence of pragmatic con-
siderations for this choice not unrelated to the obvious hegemony of a specific
liberal paradigm in the Anglo-Saxon scholarship. By labelling this undertaking
‘pluralist’ however there is a risk that one paradigm is hegemonised while others
fail even to register as legitimate philosophical discourses. Even though the edi-
tors acknowledge that ‘most contributors have reached for political philosophy as
their inspiration for reflection on the foundations and normative scope of labour
law’ (14) there is scope for more reflection on the fact that the overwhelming
majority of chapters are inspired from one variant of political philosophy.
The second point concerns the relationship between the ‘philosophical’ and
the ‘political’. The editors seemingly adopt a crude and monolithic distinction
between ‘philosophy’ as contemplation and ‘politics’ as action with no internal
relation between them. This view is evident in the following statement ad-
dressing what is perceived as a philosophical deficit in labour law. The editors
observe that
[r]ather than engaging in much philosophical enquiry, the subject of labour law has
in the past mostly comprised technical legal analysis for the purpose of assisting
© 2020 The Author. The Modern Law Review © 2020 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2021) 84(4) MLR 923–951 937
Reviews
legal practice, or evaluative discussion about the policies embodied in legislation,
or calls for activist interventions through the legal process and collective industrial
action by workers. This book provides an opportunity to stand back from those
other valuable activities and contemplate more fully the central moral and political
principles that go to the core of the existence of labour law as a field of legal practice
and scholarship (2).
Elsewhere they question whether ‘it make[s] any sense to look for coherent philo-
sophical foundations of moral and political principles for a subject like labour law
that is so clearly the product of historical and pragmatic political compromises?’ (3,
emphasis added).
These statements designate a ‘philosophical’ that emerges as a metaphysically
ordered, coherent land of calmness and unity whose gates are to be accessed by
the consciousness of labour law academics amidst the contingent, chaotic and
messy world of political compromises. The political reduced to ‘compromises’
registers only as the messy concrete to be instrumentally used for arriving at the
‘universal’ eternal foundations of the core existence of labour law but to be
then discarded as useless as one lifts herself to the universal plane of the philo-
sophical. To be sure, this crude division between the ‘philosophical’ and the
‘political’ is not indefensible. However, it is more assumed by the editors than
demonstrated. There are multiple critical accounts (such as by Unger, Gramsci,
Badiou,Laclau,Zizek or Mouffe to name a few) that problematise this relation-
ship and attempt to account for the ‘political’ as part of the philosophical. The
incorporation of such alternative perspectives would have assisted in avoiding
the naturalisation of this distinction of the political and philosophical as rad-
ically separate. An additional benefit would be that of including theories that
escape the paradox of a political philosophy of labour law without a prominent
creative foundational role for political agency which may in turn grant a space
for articulating a potential for creativity in the structure and dynamism of the
‘philosophical foundations’. This under-theorisation of the political is in my
view not unrelated to the noticeably shorter Part III on Workplace Democracy
and Self-Determination, a seemingly ideal habitat for these perspectives.
These points in no way detract from the value of this book, a fine product
of rigorous, ambitious and sophisticated labour law scholarship. It is perhaps
inevitable that as labour law consciously embraces philosophy, the subject will
bemore and not less contested.It is hard to imagine an activity fraught with more
controversies in human history than philosophy. In a somewhat perverse sense,
the intense contestation and doubting over labour law may be in themselves the
most solid sign of its existence.And even though philosophy may fail to deliver
the peaceful solace craved by labour law scholars if conducted inclusively, its
contribution lies in its capacity to re-integrate labour law questioning into the
foundational problems of politics, society and humanity fromwhich it was born.
As part of this process we all owe enormous gratitude to this book.
Ioannis Katsaroumpas∗
∗Lecturer in Employment Law, School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex.
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U. Belavusau and K. Henrard (eds), EU Anti-Discrimination Law Beyond
Gender, Oxford: Hart, 1st ed, 2018, 392 pp, hb £65.00
This edited volume explores the fate of the ‘millennium directives’ – the Race
Directive 2000/43/EC and the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC – which
expanded the EU’s anti-discrimination law beyond gender (to race and ethnic-
ity, religion, sexual orientation, age, and disability) and extended its scope (to
access to goods and services for race). For this focus, as well as for the range
and quality of its chapters, the book makes an important contribution to the
literature on EU’s anti-discrimination law.
The book is divided into two parts: the first few chapters look at more gen-
eral, theoretical, cross-cutting and procedural issues, while subsequent chap-
ters look at specific grounds. The methodology of the individual contributions
varies from the more doctrinally focused, closely analysing the directives and
the case-law (for example by Anna Slezdinska-Simon on religion, Alina Try-
fonidou on sexual orientation and Beryl P Ter Haar on age) to the theoretically
orientated.For the latter, there are discussions ranging from assessing normative
underpinnings, (eg,Morag Goodwin on the marginalisation of Roma and the
conceptual inadequacy of the Race Directive and Rachel Horton on why the
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) is more lenient when encountering measures
distinguishing by age than other grounds) to social-science-based approaches
(eg, Phillip M. Ayoub using quantitative methods to assess the EU as a source
of domestic LGB rights). Moreover, while the book overwhelmingly discusses
developments in EU law itself, it also looks beyond it, where relevant. For in-
stance, chapters refer to its domestic implementation (eg, Mathias Möschel on
race discrimination or Kristin Henrard showing the difficulties domestic courts
have with the sharing of burden of proof), and its interaction with international
law (eg,Anna Slezdinska-Simon looking at the ECHR;or Luísa Lourenço and
Pekka Pohjankoski, and Lisa Waddington, referencing the UN Convention on
the Rights of Person with Disabilities (CRPD)).
The book fills a gap in the literature by specifically focusing on grounds other
than sex/gender – the oldest ground in the EU with the richest case-law and
literature. The pre-eminence of sex/gender, however, is confirmed even in this
book which specifically looks ‘beyond’ it.Sex/gender is the inevitable reference
point for many of the authors (for example Mark Bell in discussing precarious
work) and gender is often the starting point for support of the ‘millennium
grounds’ (as Raphaële Xenidis shows, it has been feminist organising which
has mobilised on the intersectional agenda). Moreover, as the editors note in
the Introduction, one often still has to turn to sex/gender cases, since many
important doctrines, developed for the sex/gender context, such a positive ac-
tion, have yet to be adjudicated on for other grounds.
Another striking issue is that if one takes sex/gender away, it becomes clear
how few anti-discrimination cases have actually been decided by the CJEU in
the 18 years following the adoption of the ‘millennium directives’. This is par-
ticularly conspicuous for race. At the time of writing of both the book (2018)
and this review (2020), only two ‘fully fledged’ judgments had been decided on
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race and ethnicity (Feryn andCHEZ).This despite the fact that race is currently
given the widest protection under the directives. The book’s authors helpfully
suggest possible reasons for this. Both Mathias Möschel and Dimitry Kochenov
point out that seeing nationality discrimination as an internal market matter,
separate from the other anti-discrimination grounds, means that the EU does
not offer protection in many cases where matters do, actually, have racial and/or
ethnic undertones (see eg the cases Kamberaj, Runevič-Vardyn or Huskic as dis-
cussed by Möschel). The dearth of cases on discrimination on the basis of race
is even more disturbing considering the persistent marginalisation and hostility
towards certain racial and ethnic minorities in Europe,most notably the Roma.
Morag Goodwin suggests that this should not surprise us, as the Race Direc-
tive’s shallow approach – looking at the individual over groups, present rather
than history, equality of opportunity rather than result, and individual instances
of discrimination over interwoven structures of exclusion – is incapable of ad-
dressing Romani marginalisation.
Race is not the only ‘millennium ground’ to have received very limited ju-
dicial attention. At the time of writing of the book, only two ‘fully fledged’
cases were decided on religion, both regarding the wearing of the Islamic veil
in the workplace (Achbita and Bougnaoui, carefully dissected in a chapter by Eu-
genia Relaño Pastor). Since then, two other cases were decided, assessing the
wide exceptions given to employment by religious organisations in Germany.In
Egenberger, the Court was asked whether ‘membership of a Protestant church’
was a ‘genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement’ for expert
work for a Protestant church. In IR v JQ, the question was whether requiring
individuals working for religious organisations ‘to act in good faith and with
loyalty to the organisation’s ethos’ can mean dismissing a doctor who entered
into a second (civil) marriage after divorce ended his first (catholic) one.
While, in these two cases, the Court touched on one difficult issue reli-
gion throws up as a ground, namely its relationship to autonomy guarantees for
churches – there are other exciting challenges.First, the relative roles of rules on
freedom of religion and the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of reli-
gion would benefit from clarification. Second, the cases are often intersectional
– eg the ‘headscarf ’ cases combine issues having to do with religion, as well as
race/ethnicity and arguably sex/gender (discussed by Xenidis). Finally, there is
potential for clashes with other grounds – religion has in several cases in other
jurisdictions conflicted with sex/gender or sexual orientation (see eg the ‘bak-
ery’ cases, Ashers Bakery before the Supreme Court of the UK and Masterpiece
Cakeshop before the Supreme Court of the US); Slezdinska-Simon touches on
the issue. The CJEU has yet to fully engage with any of these issues, so this is a
space to watch.
The ground of sexual orientation has seen relatively high numbers of cases
compared to both race and religion. The cases have ranged from determining
rights available to same-sex partners in cases such as Maruko, Römer, Hay or
Parris, to assessing homophobic speech in Asociatia Accept (and more recently,
after the publication of this book, in Rete Lenford). Discrimination on the ba-
sis of sexual orientation has been assessed not just in the employment sphere,
which is covered by the Framework Directive,but also under the EUCharter of
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Fundamental Rights in the case of Léger, relating to blood donations by men
who have sex with other men (these cases are examined by Tryfonidou).
The grounds of age and disability have been by far the most prolific in litiga-
tion. Age,widely used in legal systems as a criterion in various policy areas and
occasionally as a proxy (eg for mental and physical capacity at both ends of the
age spectrum) is the only ground in the ‘millennium directives’ where direct
discrimination is not only given limited exceptions, but an open-ended possi-
bility of justification. The breadth of the justifications accepted by the CJEU is
subjected to critique by Horton.Focusing on old age, she notes that age appears
to be readily accepted as a stand-in for ability, whereas such use of a ground as
a proxy would be unacceptable in relation to other grounds – an individual
assessment would be required were the ground at stake sex or race. Ter Haar
comes to a more positive conclusion in answer to the question of whether the
CJEU’s treatment of young age fulfils the promises of the EU’s Youth Policy.
Much of the litigation on the ground of disability has focused on its defini-
tion. Luísa Lourenço’s and Pekka Pohjankoski’s analysis shows that the CJEU’s
relatively rich case-law has not been particularly helpful by either being too
wide,but rather vague,or too narrow and therefore limiting protection.Another
fundamental question which determines the usefulness of anti-discrimination
guarantees for the disabled is the definition of ‘reasonable accommodation’; an
obligation unique and central to the ground of disability.Here, the case law has
so far been scarce and thus provides limited guidance.While waiting for future
cases to be adjudicated, the authors note that sources external to the EU,notably
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Convention on
the Rights of Person with Disabilities, offer useful guidance. The role of the
CRPD, to which the EU is a signatory, is the subject of Lisa Waddington’s
chapter. She notes that since international agreements acquire the status of EU
law, the CJEU is bound to use the CRPD in interpreting EU secondary law,
including the Framework Directive. This has prompted a shift from a medical
understanding of disability (inChacon Navas) to a social one (HKDanmark (Ring
and Skouboe Werge)).The EU has nonetheless narrowed the concept of hindered
participation from ‘society’ to ‘professional life’. This excludes certain types of
claimants from protection (eg in the subsequent case, Z, the impairment of a
missing uterus was not deemed to hinder in professional life). She also points
out, positively, that the CRPD has had an influence on amendments to the di-
rective proposed in 2008 (not yet adopted) which would expand the scope of
anti-discrimination law for the ‘millenium grounds’ beyond employment, and
introduces a reporting mechanism.
What emerges from the book as a whole is a cautiously optimistic pic-
ture. The new grounds have introduced new types of anti-discrimination law
concepts, such as reasonable accommodation. Litigation around them has also
generated doctrinal developments, which might not have happened merely on
the ground of sex/gender, and which have enriched and expanded protection
from discrimination.For example, the Court has recognised speech as a possible
instance of discrimination (Feryn and Asociatia Accept on racist and homophobic
speech respectively). Connectedly, the Court no longer requires an identifiable
victim of discrimination (ibid) and it accepted the possibility of a case brought by
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a person who lacks a protected characteristic (CHEZ).But the case-law can also
be critiqued for not recognising intersectional discrimination (Xenidis), for an
unduly extensive use of a comparator (eg precarious work in Wippel discussed
by Bell, 84–85), and its acceptance of certain overbroad measures where a more
stringent scrutiny of proportionality might have been appropriate (eg blood
donations discussed by Tryfonidou, 245). As for the domestic implementation
of the ‘millennium directives’, it appears to vary greatly, from the competences
and activities of equality bodies, to the effectiveness of enforcement of anti-
discrimination rights by the courts. It is perhaps to the national level, both in
relation to sex/gender and beyond, that the attention of EU anti-discrimination
law scholars should turn next.
Barbara Havelková∗
Joanna Bell, The Anatomy of Administrative Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2020, xlii + 269 pp, hb £75.00
A striking feature of Joanna Bell’s book is the red rose adorning the front cover.
What, one may ask, does this have to do with administrative law? A ‘beauti-
ful’ rose seems ill-fitting to the messiness, complexity and, some would say, the
unstructured nature of administrative law; perhaps a gravy boat of ‘hotchpotch’
stew might have been more apt. For Bell the symbol of the rose is indeed cen-
tral to her anatomical approach. She recounts a monologue by the theoretical
physicist Richard Feynman that has become known as his ‘Ode to a Flower’
(6-7). This is an exchange between Feynman and an artist friend, in which the
friend bemoans the scientific preoccupation with taking things apart, and the
way that this detracts from the complete beauty of the rose. Feynman responds
that what is aesthetically pleasing can exist in many forms, and that there are all
kinds of questions that science adds into the mix of what is exciting,mysterious,
and ultimately beautiful about the flower.
From this anecdote, Bell explains Feynman’s recognition that the flower is
made up of many small components and complex processes, and as such it
cannot be neatly summed up in terms of a single idea.Now the spark of recog-
nition should be burning brighter in the minds of administrative lawyers. Ad-
ministrative law is a subject that has been grappling with the search for a single
‘organising concept’, a harmonising theory or, as Bell describes it, some ‘monis-
tic’ principle that is capable of uniting the whole compass of the subject in a
uniquely beautiful way.Bell’s is among an increasing number of voices suggest-
ing not only that such an organising concept is yet to be found,but also,adapting
Feynman’s ‘pulling apart’ anatomical method, that the search may continue to
prove fruitless. Bell describes this conclusion to her work as cynical, but to me
the book as a whole has an inherently positive and refreshing tone. In showing
∗St Hilda’s College, Oxford.
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us how we can think differently about administrative law, it is clinical rather
than cynical.
The crux of Bell’s argument is that pulling apart administrative law doc-
trine in this anatomical way demonstrates that the legal structures at play in
administrative law adjudication are both complex and varied (especially in
Chapter 3). Bell proposes three core senses of complexity: that legislative detail
matters enormously in administrative law adjudication; that administrative law
pursues varied normative goals; this variety is due both to the diverse legal ori-
gins of administrative law values, but also to the third core sense of complexity,
namely that the beneficiaries of administrative law are also varied and as such
sit in different kinds of relationships with the administrative decision-makers
they seek to challenge.
Bell joins other scholars,notably Harlow and Rawlings, and Arvind and Stir-
ton, in emphasising the messy and pluralistic origins of administrative law, in
particular by encouraging the restoration of forgotten connections with ad-
ministrative practice, and variable anchorage in different types of administrative
power (58-63). It is hard to conceive of administrative law in England and
Wales as the product of a single architect’s design, despite the crucial role ar-
guably played by individual judges. Arvind and Stirton, for example, consider
Lord Diplock to have been highly influential in the development of judicial re-
view at least (‘The curious origins of judicial review’ (2017) 133 Law Quarterly
Review 91).
A key contribution of Bell’s book is to spotlight the importance of statutory
schemes to administrative law adjudication.Her approach is not to maintain, as
others have, that a connection, perhaps any connection, to statute is crucial to
the constitutional legitimacy of judicial review, but instead to show the various
ways in which administrative law adjudication interacts with statutory schemes.
As she states:
… the grounds of review do not function as a series of freestanding legal tests
which apply directly to the facts of the case and mechanistically determine the
proper legal outcome… administrative law doctrine often interacts closely with the
particular legislative framework in the background of the challenge.The legislative
frameworks with which administrative law doctrine interacts, furthermore, are not
of one kind. Rather they vary significantly, in their aims, structure and detail, from
one to the next (66).
There are many different kinds of legislative framework: from those that are
primarily designed to regulate individualised decision-making (such as social
security and housing benefit decisions, or licencing decisions); to those that
regulate decisions about how people ought to be treated; to those which regu-
late decisions about the protection and promotion of collective public interests.
Administrative law doctrines, the so-called general principles or grounds of re-
view, interact in different ways with the structure and detail of these different
types of statutory schemes,with the statutory background itself often becoming
more complex over time;one need only think of immigration and planning law
to illustrate such complexity.Moreover, as Bell acknowledges, there is reason to
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think that the background administrative schemes to various administrative law
challenges are increasingly rich in detail. This is likely, at least in part, to be due
to a combination of the increased quantity and density of secondary legislation,
and a growing role for ‘soft law’ sources, including government guidance and
administrative policy, both in framing procedures and in structuring adminis-
trative discretion.
The various ways administrative law doctrine interacts with different statu-
tory schemes is also related to the second sense of complexity, the diversity in
the origins of administrative law values. Bell adds her unique voice to schol-
arship emphasising the significance and diversity of administrative law values
to doctrinal development. Notable here is the work of Paul Daly who has de-
veloped a values-based account of administrative law, stressing the centrality of
the rule of law, good administration, democracy and separation of powers (‘Ad-
ministrative Law:A Values-Based Approach’ in Bell,Elliott,Varuhas andMurray
(eds),Public Law Adjudication in Common Law Systems,Hart Publishing,2016,23,
35). In my own work I suggest there may well be other significant values, in-
cluding legal and administrative rationality (Reconstructing Judicial Review, Hart
Publishing, 2016); Joe Tomlinson contributes by picking apart various adminis-
trative justice values, including transparency, efficiency, accountability and equal
treatment (‘The Grammar of Administrative Justice Values’ (2017) 39 Journal of
Social Welfare and Family Law 524). Bell does not seek to provide a list of per-
tinent values, acknowledging the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of developing
an exhaustive register. Her insight is that the kind of values highlighted in that
body of work, and which are perhaps best (though not exclusively) understood
as what she terms ‘common law values’, interact in complex and diverse ways
with legislative purposes. For Bell the diversity of these values stems in part
from the range of beneficiaries of administrative law, that is those whose inter-
ests administrative law seeks to protect.
Bell concludes it is incorrect to think that administrative law is concerned
centrally with the promotion of public interests. As she states, this ‘overlooks
the inherent variety of the legislative and administrative schemes that form
the background to many administrative law challenges’ (78). She rejects the
view that administrative law can be ‘taxonomised’ or as I have referred to it
‘bifurcated or trifurcated’ by organising public law doctrines in terms of their
functions;where administrative law is seen as protecting the public interest and
human rights law individual private interests.Whereas my work has questioned
this taxonomical approach as failing to fit with the organisation of legal practice,
Bell resists it head on by questioning its fit with doctrine. As she concludes:
An attempt to allocate the grounds of review to different categories by reference
to the legal values which they serve to promote may obscure more than it will
reveal … it is difficult to draw neat lines between different categories of legal value;
there is, for instance, no clear distinction between values derived from the com-
mon law and those which underlie legislation, nor between the interests of the
public and those of the individual. This has important implications for the taxo-
nomical endeavour. It means that a singular ground of review might serve as the
basis of judicial intervention for the protection of different interests depending on
the legislative context in which a challenge arises (83).
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The third, and related, sense of complexity that Bell explains is the plurality
of relationships with which the courts grapple in administrative law adjudi-
cation and how these relationships are based on different kinds of right-duty
correlativity. She concludes, contra Jason Varuhas especially, that there are many
instances of administrative law adjudication in which courts are concerned with
individual right-duty correlativity as opposed to collective right-duty correl-
ativity. Bell provides numerous examples of legislative frameworks specifically
conferring rights on individuals, such as to receive benefits or entitlements if
they meet set criteria.Likewise, there are examples of courts regarding the com-
mon law itself as conferring procedural rights, such as to an oral hearing, or the
right to have one’s case considered under policies the executive sees fit to adopt.
From my own research I find that empirically these kinds of cases, which are
often individual grievances turning on their own facts,make up the majority of
judicial review claims in the Administrative Court, and the phrase ‘public law
right’ appears with increasing frequency across relevant case law.
While the present review focuses more on the general, conceptual and
methodological elements of Bell’s book, these elements themselves are built
from case law analysis most notably in three specific areas: procedural review,
legitimate expectations and standing. These analyses form a concrete evidence
base for Bell’s wider conclusions about the anatomy of administrative law, but
they are also important contributions advancing understanding of these topics
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6).My interpretation of Bell’s broader argument here is that
the felt need to adopt a master principle, even for a specific area of doctrine
such as procedural review,obscures the complexity and variety of administrative
law’s anatomy.This has possibly concerning consequences, such that what might
be ordinary and legitimate, perhaps even routine decisions, within a particular
framework of statutory schema, values and relationships, can come to be seen
as unpredictable, incoherent or even activist decision-making. The anatomical
approach conversely reveals greater evidence of predictability and coherence,
and more judicial restraint.
I wonder how the collective set of grounds under the heading ‘substantive
review’would fare under Bell’s microscope.Various works have identified ‘indi-
cia’ of unreasonableness, but reasonableness too is a concept that varies with the
statutory background.Quite often in case law, decisions taken against a detailed
statutory scheme (including delegated legislation and soft law) are referred to
as unreasonable, as opposed to as having been taken for an improper purpose
or falling foul of principles around the relevance of considerations. It would be
valuable to see Bell’s approach to this topic and, in particular, to observe how
the genre of common law constitutionalism, the broader culture of justifica-
tion, or Daly’s values-based account, fare as organising concepts when pulled
apart using Bell’s method, since one can argue that these approaches are gener-
ally more accommodating and sensitive to context than the jurisdictional and
public interest accounts she rejects.
Administrative law is increasingly being approached from a range of method-
ological perspectives, historical, empirical, philosophical, and combinations of
each. Some might see this increased variety as stemming from an inherent dis-
satisfaction both with existing doctrinal law, and doctrinal methods of analysis
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more generally.For example, in his review for this journal of Dean Knight’s,Vig-
ilance and Restraint in the Common Law of Judicial Review (Cambridge University
Press, 2018), Peter Cane suggests that those who use philosophical and social
scientific methods strike out in these directions because they find common
law doctrinal analysis to be ‘anaemic and unsatisfying’. It should be said that
Knight’s analysis, as Cane would classify it and as do I, is an excellent example
of doctrinal scholarship,which also provides a normative framework for assess-
ing the value of doctrine. Cane suggests that, at least the ‘judicially-approved’
role for common law scholars, is to develop principles ‘that make the whole
body of relevant law as internally consistent and coherent as reasonably possi-
ble’. In contrast,Bell’s anatomical approach does not explicitly seek out internal
consistency, rather she looks to the elements of doctrine in terms of their po-
sition, relations, structure and function. Space precludes full discussion of Bell’s
professed cynicism towards organising concepts, but a key insight is her view
that intelligibility, coherence and unity tend to be equated in the search for a
monistic principle, and that this is related to a felt need to morally justify an area
of law as a whole (230-237). Bell concludes, as do I, that no attempt to render
various doctrines coherent could be a purely descriptive exercise, but this is no
bar to accounts that strive to promote intelligibility by explaining the causes
and nature of doctrinal complexity, including by reference to values, and by
helping readers to understand why the law is not coherent. Such intricacy and
complexity, as revealed in The Anatomy of Administrative Law, is neither anaemic
nor unsatisfying, and no less aesthetically pleasing than the red rose gracing the
book’s front cover.
Sarah Nason∗
Bruce A. Kimball and Daniel R. Coquillete, The Intellectual Sword – Harvard
Law School, the Second Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2020, 880
pp, hb £39.95
The second volume of the history of the Harvard Law School, The Intellectual
Sword, by Bruce A. Kimball and Daniel R. Coquillete is a massive example of
the institutional historian’s art. I shall first summarise this book and then offer
an assessment of it.
Kimball and Coquillete pick up the story of the Harvard Law School where
its predecessor, On the Battlefield of Merit, left off – with the appointment of
A. Lawrence Lowell as the University’s new president, the retirement of Dean
James Barr Ames and the appointment of Ezra Ripley Thayer, the son of Har-
vard law professor James Bradley Thayer, as the Law School’s new Dean.Thayer,
who came directly from legal practice, saw no reason to alter the School’s finan-
cial model of low tuition, high enrollment taught in large classes, and ruthless
culling of the herd at the end of the first, and to a lesser extent second, year
∗Senior Lecturer, Bangor Law School.
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using tests administered at the end of the school year.Meticulous, by nature, he
was extremely worried that his work as both a teacher and scholar would never
be as good as that of his colleagues. It did not help that the Law School was
tuition dependent and deeply in debt from the building of Langdell Hall.These
worries grew stronger over five years and in the end likely caused Thayer to
commit suicide.
Roscoe Pound, an already famous, seemingly liberal scholar who had joined
the faculty in 1910,was the next Dean.He inherited a capital campaign, begun
by Thayer, that was ill-conceived, poorly run, interrupted by World War I, and
undermined by the University’s own efforts to build its endowment. It did not
help that Pound was uninterested in making personal appeals to possible donors
and that his written appeals for funds were leaden. While he understood that
the school’s financial situation was precarious, a following fundraising campaign
between 1925–27 was no more successful.
As Dean, Pound never wavered from his support for a large entering class
ruthlessly culled, though he did expand the geographic and social range of ac-
cepted applicants and resisted pressure from President Lowell, to reduce the en-
rollment of Jewish students.Whether his support for Jewish students extended
to Jewish faculty is complicated as he seemed to support some Jewish candidates
and oppose others.
Though well known for his early articles that argued against judicial formal-
ism and in support of sociological jurisprudence, after World War I Pound’s
politics seemed to shift rightward so that by 1930 he rose to Karl Llewellyn’s
bait in ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step.’ In reply, he published a
very weak and general objection to Llewellyn’s identification of what came to
be called American Legal Realism, but refused to identify the scholars whose
work he was attacking, and so was forever stuck in the ‘Realism Controversy’
when Llewellyn replied.
In the aftermath of the Depression and with the advent of the New Deal,
Pound became increasingly opposed to the growth of administrative agencies.
While members of his faculty were traveling to Washington to help those same
agencies, he began to make trips to Germany and Austria that indicated a
willingness to accept and perhaps cultivate recognition from the Nazi regime.
Open warfare with the faculty lead the University’s new president, James B.Co-
nant, first to assume the job of chairing Faculty meetings and then to appoint
the members of a special faculty committee on curriculum reform. The two-
year effort brought forth evidence of students’ discontent with their education,
though in the end no significant changes were made.Perhaps this show of Pres-
idential displeasure was enough for Pound, for soon after he stepped down as
Dean.
Pound’s successor was James M. Landis, a wunderkind who had become a
faculty member one year after his graduation. After seven years of teaching, he
joined the New Deal at the Federal Trade Commission and then the Securities
Exchange Commission. Landis returned to the Law School as Dean in 1937.
There he engineered a revision of the school’s admissions policies that had the
effect of reducing student attrition at the end of the first year from over 30 to
about 20 per cent.With the outbreak of World War II Landis again returned to
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Washington.When he returned to Cambridge in 1945,Landis tried to mobilise
the faculty to deal with the content of the J.D. program. However, before that
committee could accomplish anything, marital discord, and the accompanying
public scandal in what was still a small college town, quickly led him to resign
and return to Washington as chairman of the Civil Aviation Board.
Soon after Landis resigned Erwin Griswold, one of the members of
Landis’ committee on the J.D. program, was appointed Dean. These were the
years when the first wave of returning GI’s led the law school to open its doors
to returnees by offering three semesters of instruction each year. The accom-
panying pressure led to the establishment of offices to administer admissions,
placement, and alumni affairs, as well as to the construction of additional dorm
space and a commons.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s many in the University were caught up
in the second Red Scare’s investigations into communism that touched both
faculty and students. Four former and present students were caught up in these
investigations that divided both faculty and students. Interestingly Griswold’s
personal experience of the impact of an investigation on an alumnus and the
students brought him publicly to change his mind about the scope of the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment from the position that
the privilege extended only the actually guilty to one that the privilege should
also include those who feared the impact of even an unsuccessful prosecution
on their reputation.
Harvard Law School had long admitted any male who could pay and then
used the ‘intellectual sword’ to winnow the class. With growing numbers of
applications, Griswold quickly decided that such a system was untenable. The
School began to use what became know as the LSAT as part of increasingly
complicated ways of deciding who among similar test takers would be admitted.
Attrition slowly declined to about one per cent.Then in 1950 the school finally
decided to admit women. The lot of those few women who attended was not
easy and was not made easier by the faculty, especially the Dean,who regularly
reminded these students that they had taken a place in the class that might have
gone to a male breadwinner.
At the same time Griswold doubled the size of his faculty, including some
New Deal veterans, some Jewish men, but no women, and urged all to pro-
duce more scholarship, apparently rewarding those who did and so indirectly
penalising those who didn’t. He also regularised the appointments, promotion
and tenure practices. This expansion was financed by slightly increasing the
size of the first year class as well as of tuition. Though the expanded faculty
lowered the student faculty ratio significantly, Griswold did little to alter the
mostly mandatory courses in the second year. Instead, resources were put into
more and small third year and graduate classes. And finally he mounted a fairly
successful, though rather hands-off, capital campaign that funded two of the
eight buildings he built during his 21 years as dean.
Faculty, especially new faculty, experienced the Dean as heavy-handed. Stu-
dents felt oppressed, especially as the impact of selective admissions lead to a
class that was more homogenous in ability, but still grasping for the same few
spots at the top of the class.Griswold,who in retrospect seemed to be trying to
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recreate the school from his youth at a time when the social ructions that are
called the Sixties were on the horizon, in the end seemed just tired. Asked
whether he wished to be considered for the post of Solicitor General, he took
fifteen seconds before he said yes and was gone in about a month.
When Griswold retired, he was replaced by Derek Bok, who was about a
generation and a half younger. The faculty apparently breathed a sigh of relief.
The gesture turned out to be inappropriate.Bok served but two and a half years,
years that were dominated by unrest related to the Vietnam War, the lack of
African-American students and faculty at Harvard generally and at the law
school in particular, and student objections to the grading system. All three
started before Bok took office and continued after he left. While in office he
oversaw a change in the grading system from numerical to letter grades and an
upward shift in the median grade, a war-related sit-in at University Hall that
resulted in contentious disciplinary action against five law students, a civil rights
related sit in at University Hall, and a riot in Harvard Square following the Kent
State shootings of students protesting the Vietnam war that immediately dis-
rupted the Law School’s final exams. Still, Bok had done a good enough job as
Dean that he was soon named President of the University.
Albert Sacks,Bok’s Associate Dean and successor, faced problems of race and
gender in his faculty. While the ten years of his deanship saw slow but steady
growth of women law students, women law professors were another matter. A
faculty ‘boys club’, unconscious that it was such, that apparently met daily for
lunch, would seem daunting even to the newest male faculty members just as
would a class of 135,mostly male students ready for blood.So it is not surprising
that of the ten women who taught during the last six years of Sacks’ deanship,
only one, Elizabeth Owen, received a tenure-track offer; of the three hired
directly to tenure track positions two left after two years, and the third had to
fight for tenure over several years. Of the three appointed in the final years of
the deanship, only two received tenure. Similarly, of the four African American
males hired beginning in Bok’s administration, two eventually left.
At the end of Sacks’s term of office, continued student agitation for grading
reform and a more general concern about the curriculum all got shunted to
what was called the Michelman Committee. That committee may have been
broadly representative of the faculty, but in any case it led to no significant
change on either topic. And while nothing much was happening, what Sacks
had done was to support a great expansion of extracurricular groups loosely
tied to the law school and the first attempts a providing clinical experiences.
The Intellectual Sword finally ends with a brief discussion of the fights over
Critical Legal Studies that broke out with the faculty discussion of the Michel-
man Committee’s report, the growth of Law and Economics and other conser-
vative movements among the faculty, fights over appointments, and finally an
assertion that the School’s continuing failure to address its financial problems,
caused by the unremitting reliance on a financial model that necessitated large
enrollment taught in large classes, led to a culture of male student competition
that made it hard for the School to open to women, as well as students of color.
We have needed a serious history of the Harvard Law School for a quite a
while now and I say that as a person who loved Arthur Sutherland’s history for
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the gracious elegance of the story it told. This second volume of that needed
history is just as exhaustively researched and reader-friendly as the first.Like the
first volume, it tells us something about student life inside the Law School, this
time in the 1970’s and 1980’s when it finally broadened out from the top fifty
or so students in a class. It also deals forthrightly with the University’s and so
the Law School’s problems with females, Blacks and other minorities, and Jews
as teachers and students. And it situates the story that it tells within the social
and political surround.
It tells the reader much, perhaps too much, about the problems with the
School’s continuing financial dependency based on the model of large entering
classes of students who were intentionally and ruthlessly pruned. This was the
model Langdell and Ames had bequeathed the school and, more importantly,
one that because of its seeming success validated the choice of most law schools
to adopt the same financial structure.
The authors offer many names for this program of education designed to es-
tablish ‘academic merit’,most tellingly ‘The Intellectual Sword’, but also ‘Spar-
tan manliness’. Both combined notions of learning and battle. In the earlier
years the products of such an education were seen as predominantly white
male Protestant Christians. When combined, the program and its product re-
call the notion of Muscular Christianity that began to appear in American cul-
ture about the same time as the Harvard Law School became Langdell’s Law
School.A good example of the muscular Christian male is President Theodore
Roosevelt of Buffalo Hunter and Rough Rider fame. Of course, the Harvard
faculty’s understanding of this model of the good young lawyer moved the field
of battle from the outdoors into the classroom. Still, this ideal survived at least
into the post-World War II years and the struggle for the inclusion of Jewish,
female and African- American faculty showed its lingering strength.
In identifying this continuity I do not wish to be seen as singling the
Harvard faculty out for special opprobrium. I am pretty sure that in many places
Muscular Christianity was a commonplace understanding of the world. In those
places it was as invisible as water would be to a fish. But I do wish to note that
the failure to label this understanding as an ideology contrasts with the decision
to let pass without comment the assertion that Critical Legal Studies was an
ideology, a way that those of us in that movement understood the water we
swam in.
The failure to recognise that ‘The Intellectual Sword’ was an ideology of its
own, such that when Harvard deans had a chance to alter the School’s financial,
and so academic model, that road was regularly not taken, raises the question
of exactly why the book’s narrative is organised in terms of deanships. Thayer’s
deanship amounted to nothing. All Pound succeeded in doing was to maintain
a graduate degree program that may have or may not have drawn funding from
the School’s already tight budget for the professional degree program. Landis’s
tenure was too short and intermittent to have done better. Griswold’s greatest
achievement seems to have been to bully the faculty into doing what he told
them to, though personal credit must be given to his broadened understand-
ing of the Fifth Amendment and expansion of the faculty to include Roosevelt
Administration administrators.Bok was not around long enough to accomplish
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much; Sacks was around long enough to accomplish much, but didn’t, appar-
ently because he was too nice a guy. The only thing that holds this progression
together is a continuing reluctance to tamper with the undergraduate program,
especially the first year centered in common laws subjects, even though it was
slowly aging, if not ossifying.
With such a record of inaction, wars would have been a sufficient organis-
ing principle since there were three of them, each with a particular impact on
the school. However, the choice to organise the book in terms of deanships
did have one advantage that wars would have lacked. It focused the narrative
on matters of internal bureaucracy. Doing so avoided the necessity of attend-
ing to the oddness of learning interesting things about student life and almost
nothing about faculty life. What did faculty do all day other than teach and
maybe produce casebooks? The reader learns surprisingly little about faculty
scholarship after the completion of Williston’s treatise on Contracts and Scott’s
on Trusts except for some work by Pound, a bit by Frankfurter, and then later
by Henry Hart, Al Sacks and Lon Fuller. The shortness of this list of names
provides modest support for those Harvard presidents and some Law School
Deans who regularly complained about how little scholarship the faculty as a
whole produced. Whether this assertion was true when measured against the
work of scholars at other major law schools is another matter.
I doubt whether attention to the scholarship of other Harvard faculty mem-
bers could have been that embarrassing. Every faculty has tenured colleagues
whose publications were of questionable value or closer to non-existent than
a dean might have liked. And speaking of colleagues, soon after moving from
Columbia in the late 1920’s, Thomas Reed Powell observed that, compared to
the life at his former school,Harvard had ‘little faculty culture.’Could this have
been true when the faculty shared lunch five days a week, an event that seems
not to have been particularly welcoming of newcomers,especially women? And
who paid for these lunches – student tuition?
Now, the failure to see ideology everywhere it is found and to address faculty
life and scholarship, should not be taken to diminish the achievement that is
this volume and its predecessor, but rather to set a mark for later scholars to
address – and where the Harvard Law School is concerned there will be some.
Such later scholars will have their work cut out for ‘The Intellectual Sword’
is an extraordinary achievement. To research so exhaustively and organise the
resulting mountain of material into a really coherent,well-written whole, even
though doing a more complete job was undermined by a suspicious change
in Harvard Library policy about access to administrative records and personal
papers, justly requires the highest professional accolades. I am pleased to offer
them.
John Henry Schlegel∗
∗The University at Buffalo School of Law.
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